How Does Ambition Affect Macbeths Character

Thursday, April 28, 2022 11:28:58 AM

How Does Ambition Affect Macbeths Character



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Macbeth Character Analysis

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Nel XVII secolo cede la parte decorativa all' antiporta e vi compaiono le indicazioni di carattere pubblicitario riferite all'editore, un tempo riservate al colophon. In epoca moderna, le illustrazioni e parte delle informazioni si sono trasferite sulla copertina o sulla sovraccoperta e altre informazioni nel verso del frontespizio. Nel libro antico i "nervi" sono i supporti di cucitura dei fascicoli.

I nervi possono essere lasciati a vista e messi in evidenza attraverso la "staffilatura" , oppure nascosti in modo da ottenere un dorso liscio. Nel libro moderno i nervi sono di norma finti, apposti per imitare l'estetica del libro antico e conferire importanza al libro. Se esse fanno parte integrante del testo sono chiamate illustrazioni. Esse hanno una numerazione di pagina distinta da quella del testo; vengono impresse su una carta speciale, quasi sempre una carta patinata.

Altri progetti. Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Disambiguazione — "Libri" rimanda qui. Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Libri disambigua. Disambiguazione — Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Libro disambigua. Pagina del Codex Argenteus. Storia, tecnica, strutture. Arma di Taggia, Atene, , p. All ,, of you. URL consultato il 15 agosto There are ,, of them. At least until Sunday. URL consultato il 5 giugno Scribes, Script and Books , p. Dover Publications , p. Libro VI, capitolo Cambridge University Press , pp. Casson, op. Solo codici venivano usati dai cristiani per far copie delle Sacre Scritture e anche per altri scritti religiosi. Gli undici codici biblici di questo periodo sei con la Septuaginta e cinque con parti del Nuovo Testamento sono su codici.

Colin H. Roberts e T. ISBN Hagedorn et al. Blanchard cur. Ritrovamenti del III secolo : di cui 15 sono codici greci di pergamena e 2 latini di pergamena; IV secolo : di cui 56 in pergamena; V secolo : di cui 46 in pergamena. Willis su Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies , p. Scribes, Script and Books , pp. Saint Benedict and His Monks. Staples Press Ltd , pp. Latin Palaeography , pp. URL consultato il 26 agosto archiviato dall' url originale il 4 dicembre Oxford , p. URL consultato il 20 agosto archiviato dall' url originale il 19 agosto Altre edizioni: —84, , —93 edizione italiana, Literary machines URL consultato il 10 gennaio Altri progetti Wikiquote Wikizionario Wikimedia Commons.

Portale Editoria. Portale Letteratura. Categorie : Libro Opere letterarie per tipo. Menu di navigazione Strumenti personali Accesso non effettuato discussioni contributi registrati entra. Namespace Voce Discussione. Visite Leggi Modifica Modifica wikitesto Cronologia. Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Tavoletta supporto. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Rotulus. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Codice filologia. LA « Quam brevis inmensum cepit membrana Maronem!

Ipsius vultus prima tabella gerit. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Papiro e Pergamena. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Manoscritto. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Stampa a caratteri mobili e Incunabolo. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Formato carta. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Libro tascabile. Lo stesso argomento in dettaglio: Risguardi. I monaci o altri che le scrivevano, venivano pagati profumatamente. I primi libri stampati, i singoli fogli e le immagini che furono creati prima del in Europa, sono noti come incunaboli. Folio 14 recto del Vergilius romanus che contiene un ritratto dell'autore Virgilio. Da notare la libreria capsa , il leggio ed il testo scritto senza spazi in capitale rustica.

Leggio con libri catenati , Biblioteca Malatestiana di Cesena. Incunabolo del XV secolo. Si noti la copertina lavorata, le borchie d'angolo e i morsetti. Insegnamenti scelti di saggi buddisti , il primo libro stampato con caratteri metallici mobili, Le macchine da stampa a vapore diventarono popolari nel XIX secolo. Queste macchine potevano stampare 1. Le macchine tipografiche monotipo e linotipo furono introdotte verso la fine del XIX secolo.

Hart , la prima biblioteca di versioni elettroniche liberamente riproducibili di libri stampati. I libri a stampa sono prodotti stampando ciascuna imposizione tipografica su un foglio di carta. Le varie segnature vengono rilegate per ottenere il volume. L'apertura delle pagine, specialmente nelle edizioni in brossura , era di solito lasciata al lettore fino agli anni sessanta del XX secolo , mentre ora le segnature vengono rifilate direttamente dalla tipografia. Nei libri antichi il formato dipende dal numero di piegature che il foglio subisce e, quindi, dal numero di carte e pagine stampate sul foglio. Le "carte di guardia", o risguardi, o sguardie, sono le carte di apertura e chiusura del libro vero e proprio, che collegano materialmente il corpo del libro alla coperta o legatura.

Non facendo parte delle segnature , non sono mai contati come pagine. Si chiama "controguardia" la carta che viene incollata su ciascun "contropiatto" la parte interna del "piatto" della coperta, permettendone il definitivo ancoraggio. Le sguardie sono solitamente di carta diversa da quella dell'interno del volume e possono essere bianche, colorate o decorate con motivi di fantasia nei libri antichi erano marmorizzate.

Il colophon o colofone, che chiude il volume, riporta le informazioni essenziali sullo stampatore e sul luogo e la data di stampa. In origine nei manoscritti era costituito dalla firma o subscriptio del copista o dello scriba, e riportava data, luogo e autore del testo; in seguito fu la formula conclusiva dei libri stampati nel XV e XVI secolo, che conteneva, talvolta in inchiostro rosso, il nome dello stampatore, luogo e data di stampa e l' insegna dell'editore. Sopravvive ancor oggi, soprattutto con la dicitura Finito di stampare. Nel libro antico poteva essere rivestita di svariati materiali: pergamena, cuoio, tela, carta e costituita in legno o cartone.

Poteva essere decorata con impressioni a secco o dorature. Ciascuno dei due cartoni che costituiscono la copertina viene chiamato piatto. Nel XIX secolo la coperta acquista una prevalente funzione promozionale. Ha caratterizzato a lungo l'editoria per l'infanzia e oggi, ricoperto da una "sovraccoperta", costituisce il tratto caratteristico delle edizioni maggiori. Le "alette" o "bandelle" comunemente dette "risvolti di copertina" sono le piegature interne della copertina o della sovraccoperta vedi infra. Generalmente vengono utilizzate per una succinta introduzione al testo e per notizie biografiche essenziali sull'autore. Di norma, riporta le indicazioni di titolo e autore. I libri con copertina cartonata in genere sono rivestiti da una "sovraccoperta". Oltre al taglio "superiore" o di "testa" vi sono il taglio esterno, detto "davanti" o "concavo" , e il taglio inferiore, detto "piede".

I tagli possono essere al naturale, decorati o colorati in vario modo. In questi ultimi casi, si parla di "taglio colore", nel passato usati per distinguere i libri religiosi o di valore dalla restante produzione editoriale, utilizzando una spugna imbevuta di inchiostri all' anilina anni del XX secolo. Riporta solitamente titolo, autore, e editore del libro. Sovente riporta un motto. Assente nel libro antico. I primi incunaboli e manoscritti non avevano il frontespizio, ma si aprivano con una carta bianca con funzione protettiva.

Nel XVII secolo cede la parte decorativa all' antiporta e vi compaiono le indicazioni di carattere pubblicitario riferite all'editore, un tempo riservate al colophon. In epoca moderna, le illustrazioni e parte delle informazioni si sono trasferite sulla copertina o sulla sovraccoperta e altre informazioni nel verso del frontespizio. Nel libro antico i "nervi" sono i supporti di cucitura dei fascicoli. I nervi possono essere lasciati a vista e messi in evidenza attraverso la "staffilatura" , oppure nascosti in modo da ottenere un dorso liscio.

Nel libro moderno i nervi sono di norma finti, apposti per imitare l'estetica del libro antico e conferire importanza al libro. Se esse fanno parte integrante del testo sono chiamate illustrazioni. Esse hanno una numerazione di pagina distinta da quella del testo; vengono impresse su una carta speciale, quasi sempre una carta patinata. Altri progetti. Da Wikipedia, l'enciclopedia libera. Disambiguazione — "Libri" rimanda qui. Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Libri disambigua. Disambiguazione — Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Libro disambigua.

Pagina del Codex Argenteus. Storia, tecnica, strutture. Arma di Taggia, Atene, , p. All ,, of you. URL consultato il 15 agosto There are ,, of them. At least until Sunday. URL consultato il 5 giugno Scribes, Script and Books , p. Dover Publications , p. Libro VI, capitolo Shockley, Texas Instruments, and Fairchild were set up explicitly with the idea of capturing the lucrative contracts of the US Air Force. The Pentagon funded nearly all early semiconductor research, and played a big role in the industry by being a price-indiscriminate buyer. The major event of my life this year was to move from Hong Kong to Beijing. I like a remark from a friend: Beijing is a city that emanates a sense of sinister power, in a way that Mumbai and Naples also do.

Beijing was founded to be the point that connects the horse lands of the north with the rice lands of the south. Although muskets made horses obsolete, Beijing has clung on to be the capital mostly continuously for years. There are not many cities that are more interesting to live in. There are many easier places in Asia for that: Hong Kong is a tropical island, Singapore basically the same, Taipei is wonderfully livable, and Tokyo is Tokyo. Beijing is the magnet for many of the smartest people in China, and then for many interesting people in the world. The conversations one has in San Francisco and New York now feel so limited, to no more than a dozen topics that people turn over and over again. I wish that more young people would spend some time living abroad.

This year I can add one more: TikTok. Both are great things. Will the next decade be different, such that we see a burst of globally-exciting cultural creations? That question can best be answered from Beijing. Friends tend to ask if the air in Beijing is bad. I averaged two weeks on the road every month in , mostly around Asia, California, and New York; the longest stretch was a continuous seven weeks away. Tech would be less made fun of if it were more integrated with LA. My total work output was higher this year in spite of much more time on the road. One has to learn to be effective at every step: preparing for trips, sustaining energy during the trip, and delivering output afterwards.

Otherwise the whole thing breaks down. The best place to start for anyone interested in my work this year is the Bloomberg Odd Lots podcast I recorded with Joe in June. I was very happy this year to become a contributor to Bloomberg Opinion. I was also pleased to be invited by the Asia Society to give two talks. The second was an event co-hosted with the Financial Times at UC Berkeley, where I spoke on a panel on technology decoupling. Both recordings are on Youtube, and if scheduling works out I expect to do a bit more public speaking next year. I liked this series of movie posters designed by Huang Hai; this one is of Spirited Away, my other favorites are of Ash is Purest White.

This year I came across three essays that show deep respect for the metaphysical lives of animals. They are good examples of what the best in humanities could be. And they exemplify the type of whimsical, passionate projects that I wish more of us would create. In Castoria , by Justin E. Smith, is a meditation on the historical idea of the beaver. Among the issues it resolves: beavers and castration; their frightening power to fell whole trees; their portrayal as the most industrious of all animals. Do elephants have souls? I wonder about the sort of novels we should hope that elephants can write.

Consider the whimsical animal series , by Katherine Rundell, an expanding set of profiles of delightful animals, like the wombat, the narwhal, the lemur. My favorites are the profiles of the swift and the golden mole , a poor blind creature distantly related to the elephant, whose fur gently glows. It follows that we have agency on how quickly we can maintain the pace of technology improvements. The semiconductor industry set a benchmark for improvement early on, one that seems kind of arbitrary today, and made a collective effort to execute against it. Now I wonder to what extent we can replicate exponential progress by doing some branding.

Coming up with that label might be a kind of low-hanging fruit that would encourage greater growth. Semiconductors are upstream of all electronics, which is a sector that has been vibrantly innovative over the last few decades. If we had exponential progress in a few more upstream technologies, we may be able to enjoy faster innovation in fields beyond computers, software, and the internet. Silicon Valley is rightly celebrated as a driver of innovation and wealth creation. Companies there are very good at building software on top of and abstracted from the physical world. The tech companies we hear most often about tend to be capital-light, beautifully-scalable businesses that earn the most handsome returns for investors.

Focusing on industrial technologies is more like taking a firm hold of the supply curve and pulling it downwards; that process can unconstrain the growth of many downstream companies. For example, energy is upstream of everything in the economy; think about how much more room AI would have to play with if energy costs were measured in cents rather than dollars. Smartphone components today would have been military-grade technology just two decades ago. Their costs have been brought down in some cases by the hundredfold, and are cheap enough to create whole new categories of products, like the consumer drone and virtual reality headsets. Instead of being enamored with downstream, consumer-facing internet companies, I wish more people could be excited about upstream, industrial technology companies.

This is a triumph of scientists and engineers over financial types, who would question why an abstract scientific challenge should be invoked for capital allocation decisions. In my view, this sort of irrationality is not a bad thing. In many cases, we should invest more in upstream technologies, even if we have no idea what sort of downstream uses they may enable. This year, my tastes in music veered towards the more adventurous. That means I made a conscious decision to dwell less on Beethoven and Wagner. The first two were nice examples of technical perfection, I enjoyed the third one the best.

Shostakovich may have had too much fun for his own good when he composed Lady Macbeth. The best parts of the opera come from the juxtaposition of beautiful musical passages with wildly inappropriate desires acted out on stage. For example, when a kulak decides that he will at last make a move on his daughter-in-law, forcing down the bedroom door if necessary, the music erupts into a gorgeous Viennese waltz. Shostakovich is not the only composer to play these kinds of games. The general plan should not be to absorb a whole work sequentially and all at once. Instead, the plan should be to look for small moments as entry points, which one can use as beachheads to expand towards the rest of the work. While most parts of every opera are boring, some parts are the peaks of composed music.

Nobody, I submit, can sit in rapture for the entirety of every performance. I mean that literally, in the sense that even the most beautiful bits will not necessarily register cognitively until a dozen times of repeated listening, often with more than one conductor. First, the endings of acts tend to burst with drama, in which large parts of the cast gather around to issue a gigantic statement of terror or grief; Verdi especially means for these scenes to arouse.

Second, look for scenes with multiple voices, like duets, trios, and quartets—to me, these represent the musical peaks. Rarely am I very moved by solos or the entire chorus. I found the quartets in Don Giovanni and Rigoletto to be compelling beyond belief, and they were responsible for drawing me into the rest of Mozart and Verdi. I consider the best parts of Verdi to be the ruminative sections, like the quartets in Don Carlo and Rigoletto , in which each person is making a private confession of grief or joy, where none can enjoy the consistent support of the orchestra.

Or the concluding duet of Aida , in which the tenor and soprano come to terms that death is the condition for politically-forbidden love, their voices rising and falling on top of shimmering strings. Muti is certainly my favorite Verdi conductor. Whereas the best of Verdi are the ruminative parts, the best of Mozart are in the flourishes, in which strings propel the action. Instead of dwelling on something marvelously beautiful, as Strauss would, Mozart wraps things up so that he can get on to unfurling the next perfect moment.

I spent a lot of time this year listening to the Da Ponte operas. Many conductors have recorded these works, I like Currentzis and Gardiner the best. I feel that Mozart has a tendency to be ironic and cheerful. Figaro and Cosi are less serious and more dialectical. Everyone has a chance to be deceitful and villainous, there is no single person who is the obvious rake. The tender moments of Figaro and Cosi feel more real, and they feature a better use of irony. My favorite morsels from these works include the false wooing of Fiordiligi by Ferrando, the false acceptance of wooing by Susanna from Count Almaviva, and the way-too-real wooing of Donna Elvira by Don Giovanni. Here is Tyler on Mozart and his advice on how to get into opera.

This was a busy year for work given the escalating trade war. Fragments of that work exist in public. There are also bits of my commentary in news stories. Last year , I visited many cities of the Sinosphere. This year, aside from some time in Tokyo and Berlin, most of travel was in China itself. The two I missed were Tianjin and Suzhou. The least interesting city of them all is Wuhan, which seems to have nothing other than industry, and no food worth remarking upon. I had the most fun in Hangzhou and Chongqing. Start the trip in Chongqing, a chaotic city in a bizarre geographic setting, with tall buildings growing out of gorges and hills.

No wonder the gallery of cyberpunk transformations of Chongqing seems so fitting. Then head to Hangzhou, which I consider the most pleasant large city in China; when I gazed at its lake and surrounding hills of tea plantations, I thought it could plausibly resemble parts of Ontario or upstate New York. Walking around, one can tell that Hangzhou anchored the richest region of China for 1, years, why the poets dwelled there to find inspiration, and why the emperors liked to visit. I regret that I wrote only three pieces on this site in How Technology Grows is an elaboration of my thoughts on definite optimism : that we should reach for economic growth and pay more attention to the industrial world.

The essay also makes the point that knowledge ought to be considered a living product, which needs to be practiced for it to be even sustained at its current level. Much more of my quick-take output has moved to emails and group texts, with some of it spilling over to Twitter. This year I watched only a handful of movies, I think fewer than a half-dozen, and no TV. Ash is Purest White , Jia Zhangke. The trailer is great. One kind of knows now what one is getting into with Jia: he will offer poignant scenes, sometimes dropping in the baffling or surreal, and adding a touch of the supernatural.

Jia prefers understatement, but the prospect of violence hovers more closely in sight in this more than his other movies. There are many references to his previous works. Jia used mobile phones to marvelous effect in The World , and the evolution of their use features prominently in Ash is Purest White. This time I saw it in 70mm with a full sound system at the Alamos Drafthouse and found the experience stunning. I thought that the depictions of space travel and orbiting structures were really marvelous. Afterwards I was astonished to discover that the movie was released in , i. The government made a political decision that technology should come before poverty relief. Whereas Kennedy directed his gaze towards celestial bodies, Khrushchev—who supervised the construction of subway lines in Moscow—concerned himself with matters closer to the earth.

It was an impassioned argument on the virtues of construction in concrete, lasting the better part of two hours. Has any other modern head of state been so full of whimsy as Khrushchev, and could make such a well-informed case for a building material? Concrete construction prompted a building boom of squat, low-cost apartment buildings that earned the affectionate name of Khrushchyovka. No wonder the USSR urbanized so quickly. Khrushchev listened to his scientific and engineering advisors, gained personal conviction of the superiority of concrete, and took it upon himself to sell the idea to the public, which he did with enthusiasm. Some of the street scenes were filmed live with a hidden camera. The Dream is our Proust. I mean that the plot is mostly beside the point: one needs not ever care about our protagonist, who is an absurd boy.

Instead, it is about drinking in the scenes of everyday life that make the novel so worthwhile. The novel features many details. How the noble Jia family, which managed to produce an imperial concubine, has to pay attention to the changing political currents at court. How the family has to manage an enormous staff of servants, who are able to assert their independence by generating an endless stream of gossip.

How the women, both noble and common, could spend all day weaving. I thought that the second half of the dream was most interesting. The family is no longer prosperous and has to suffer unrelenting woe. The characters then stop being such models of piety and literary virtuosity, instead descending into deception, pride, and superstition. The Dream has one important difference with Proust worth highlighting: Cao uses his considerable powers to paint vivid female leads, while his men tend to be boring and stupid. Our protagonist literally turns into an imbecile in the final quarter of our dream.

To my surprise, my nonfiction reading revolved around three political biographies this year. I found the books about Deng and Park to be useful, and the book about Johnson to be most enjoyable. At last I can appreciate why my friend Kevin Kwok is prosecuting such a spirited campaign to compel everyone he knows to read the Caro books. The usual exhaustion of following small details never overwhelmed me, because Caro is so earnest about their importance. Instead I feel that I can play a more useful role by pointing towards more obscure works. Of this genre I wish to cast a spotlight on three. Most faiths and pagan myths take the side of the crowd when they strike down their victims, who are denounced to be the cause of general misfortune and woe. The Bible takes the side of victims.

It offers one example after another to show how crowds can be whipped up to persecute the innocent. I thought that nearly every page of this book offered insight, all the way through the end where Girard evaluates Nietzsche. I consider the Cultural Revolution to be the greatest possible Girardian nightmare, and I wish that many more Chinese would study the work of Girard. More people should get to know the virtues of Girardian renunciation and forbearance. The Vienna Circle held monthly discussions to clarify questions in language, logic, and mathematics. Its members produced insights that fundamentally advanced progress in physics and computing. The group probed ever more abstract questions while the real world fell apart around them.

They wanted to debate logic, but increasingly unnerving events of the world had a tendency to intervene—the German annexation of Austria was not even the most severe disruption that the group had to face. This society of logicians and mathematicians was shockingly susceptible to murder and intrigue. Ludwig Boltzmann died by his own hand, after declaring that too many smart people become obsessed with sterile pseudo-problems. To deliver his daily lectures, which he always prepared with meticulous care, he had developed a peculiar technique and carried it to its limits. How did the merely wealthy try to match the fashions of the actually noble elite, and how did the elite stay a step ahead? How did local cadres attempt to govern in an age of growing commercial sophistication?

How did the empire deal with massive weather disruptions through the Little Ice Age? Why did the spread of the printing press cause a century of sectarian warfare in Europe, but barely a political ripple for the Ming? Brook offers answers to these questions and many others. My favorite parts were about how foreigners and imperial subjects were able to travel throughout the empire, on a well-functioning logistics network. This book and the Dream offer reminders of the importance of the material world. We take tools and trinkets for granted, but these books remind us how difficult it was to produce anything at all, much less move it at any distance.

He is someone we can say has been living a full life. Semiconductors are kind of a successful application of US industrial policy. My life this year was not totally bereft of television entertainment. I found it a deep experience, and I thank my friend Dave Petersen for putting it on TV and insisting that I watch it with him. At first I found the show too gruesome to endure. But the more I watched, the more I was engrossed. Not so much by the fight, but by everything around the fight. When I saw the Berlin Philharmonic this year, I thought about the complex system required to produce music of this quality. The few dozen musicians on stage are extraordinarily talented. The program was Schoenberg and Mozart, and I thought about how long it took to develop such a deep repertory of pieces that would include these two composers.

I can also bring up the technologies required for the orchestra. The Berlin audience was sophisticated, and that takes time to develop too. That is a wonderful system that has gotten a lot of things right. UFC is an amazing spectacle, and so many things had to be developed before something of that quality could be produced. Think of Vegas, first of all, a remote city in the desert that has managed to attract people, not just for this fight, but year-round for entertainment. Second, consider all the accouterments around the fight: the seamless transitions; the interludes from Joe Rogan and Bruce Buffer, who are both talented announcers; the special effects of lighting, fog, and music, all of which combine to marvelous effect.

Third, think about what it takes to market this type of event. And finally the fighters themselves, who know what they have to do to provide a good show. It was then I felt that I grasped how outstanding the US is at producing entertainment. This is a valuable cultural competence. I failed this year when it comes to the most important type of learning activity that I do: playing enough sessions of Avalon , my favorite board game.

The goal for the good people is to discover the identities of the evil people; the goal for the evil people is to insinuate themselves as good people. Everyone takes turns proposing different configurations of people to make up a team. Gameplay is simple, the dynamics are not. There are several remarkable things about Avalon. I play with different groups in a few cities, and perceive a distinct hierarchy of competence. At the bottom of the hierarchy are tech people in San Francisco: they tend to misread probabilities, stick with their early impressions of people without updating their views given new information, and are worse at moving fluidly between good and evil roles.

The very best Avalon players are mainland Chinese, who astonish me again and again with their brilliance. So the Allies might send surveillance planes to where the enemy is known to be, make sure that the enemy sees these planes, and engage in combat only afterwards. One is always asking: how deeply to press the information advantage, and is it possible to generate alternative explanations for success? Avalon rewards people for being both social and deductive. Avalon is more like poker, in which a player has to persuade with both logic and lies. I loved this gallery of different celestial bodies produced by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory: Visions of the Future , with a hat tip to natfriedman.

When I cast my eye around the industrial world, I see many consolidated industries. We went from having around 20 DRAM memory chip makers in to 11 in , and just 3 players today. Wide-body aircraft is a well-known duopoly made up of Boeing and Airbus. This list can go on. So why does so much of the popular antitrust discussion in the US focus on internet companies, which I would say for the most part are providing nearly free products to consumers? But as a first cut, I think that there are worthier tech targets for competition regulators than the internet giants. Any sufficiently-capitalized firm is able to buy leading tools from the market to make advanced technology products. But industrial technology companies are concentrated in only a handful of rich countries.

In a more extreme case, PCs and software is accessible to most people in the world, but nearly all large internet companies are based in either the US or China. And should some other hard-to-measure factor be thrown into that consideration? Will we see an acceleration of Chinese cultural products becoming globally popular, or will most of them be confined to being displayed in Beijing, Shanghai, and Chengdu? I consider Definite Optimism as Human Capital to be my most creative piece. So I thought to write a followup to lay out its premises more directly and to offer a restatement of its ideas. I submit that we have two big biases when we talk about technology. First, we think about it too much in terms of tools and recipes, when really we should think about it more in terms of process knowledge and technical experience.

Second, most of us focus too much on the digital world and not enough on the industrial world. Our obsession with the digital world has pushed our expectation of the technological future in the direction of cyberpunk dystopia; I hope instead that we can look forward to a joyful vision of the technological future, driven by advances in industry. Process knowledge is represented by an experienced workforce. The tools and IP held by these firms are easy to observe. I think that the process knowledge they possess is even more important.

The process knowledge can also be referred to as technical and industrial expertise; in the case of semiconductors, that includes knowledge of how to store wafers, how to enter a clean room, how much electric current should be used at different stages of the fab process, and countless other things. This kind of knowledge is won by experience. Anyone with detailed instructions but no experience actually fabricating chips is likely to make a mess. I believe that technology ultimately progresses because of people and the deepening of the process knowledge they possess.

The accumulated process knowledge plus capital allows the semiconductor companies to continue to produce ever-more sophisticated chips. This cluster of talent allows the US to maintain its lead on a critically-important technology. The US industrial base has been in decline. But sustained innovation in semiconductors is an exception in US manufacturing. The country used to nurture vibrant communities of engineering practice a term I like from Brad DeLong , which is another way to talk about the accumulated process knowledge in many segments of industry. But not all communities of engineering practice have been in good shape.

The real output of the US manufacturing sector is at a lower level than before the recession; that means that there has not been real growth in US manufacturing for an entire decade. In fact, this measure may be too rosy—the ITIF has put forward an argument that manufacturing output measures are skewed by excessive quality adjustments in computer speeds. Take away computers, which fewer and fewer people are buying these days, and US real output in manufacturing would be meaningfully lower.

Manufacturing employment peaked in at nearly 20 million workers; it fell to 17 million in , 14 million in , and stands at 12 million today. When firms and factories go away, the accumulated process knowledge disappears too. Industrial experience, scaling expertise, and all the things that come with learning-by-doing would decay. I visited Germany earlier this year to talk to people in industry. One point Germans kept bringing up was that the US has de-industrialized itself and scattered its production networks. While Germany responded to globalization by moving up the value chain, the US manufacturing base mostly responded by abandoning production.

Brad Setser has shown that the US stands out amongst rich countries for its low level of manufactured goods exports. Instead, the US runs both a trade deficit and a current account deficit. In order for other countries to import more from the US, first it should have better goods to sell. Knowledge should circulate throughout the supply chain, flowing both up and down the stack. Successful industries tend to cluster into tight-knit production networks.

The easiest way to appreciate the marvel of clusters is to look at Silicon Valley, where capital, academia, a large pool of eager labor, and companies both large and small sit next to each other. There are many other examples of industrial clusters. Silicon Valley is so-named because it was the center of semiconductor production and it has enough toxic Superfund sites nearby to prove that heritage. Proximity makes it easier to generate process knowledge. But what happens when we tear apart these production networks by separating design and manufacturing?

But I believe that in most cases, dislocation makes it more difficult to maintain process knowledge. Both the design process and production process generate useful information, and dislocation makes it difficult for that information to circulate. I think we tend to discount how much knowledge we can gain in the course of production, as well as how it should feed back into the design process. Arjun Narayan tells me that good software design requires a deep understanding of chips, and vice versa. The best developers are those who understand how processes interact both up and down the stack.

What happens when we stop the flow of knowledge up the stack? I think that the weakness of the US industrial robotics sector is instructive. The US has little position in making high-end precision manufacturing equipment. When it comes to factory automation systems, machine tools, robot arms, and other types of production machinery, the most advanced suppliers are in Japan, Germany, and Switzerland. I think the reason that the US has little position can be tied directly to the departure of firms from so many segments of manufacturing. It might be fine to think that robots will be doing all the manufacturing work in the future; but someone has to build these robots, and own the IP of advanced robotmaking, and for the most part, that someone is not the US.

The decline of industrial work makes it harder to accumulate process knowledge. If a state has lost most of its jobs for electrical engineers, civil engineers, or nuclear engineers, then fewer young people will enter into these fields. Technological development slows down, and it turns into a self-reinforcing cycle of decline. Every 20 years, caretakers completely tear down the shrine and build it anew. The wooden shrine has been rebuilt again and again for 1, years.

Regularly tearing down and rebuilding a wooden temple might not sound like a great use of time. Every so often we discover ancient tools of which we have no idea how to use. These shrine caretakers have decided that preservation of production knowledge is important, and I find that admirable. Building a vast industrial base and practicing learning-by-doing used to be the American way. So that the 20th century became an American century, rather than a second British century, in large part because of the bets Hamilton had induced the United States to make on not simply following comparative advantage. The future should be more than services. One of the issues with services jobs in the US is that most of the gains are captured by very few workers.

Two services sectors are enormously productive: tech and finance. Another issue with a lot of service work is that much of it is zero-sum, a point made very well by Adair Turner. And often the zero-sumness is asymmetric: a dozen hackers make a theft, and companies everywhere subsequently need to spend collective billions on staff or contractors to protect themselves; a few criminal plague a state, and the government subsequently needs to hire hundreds of officers to make people feel safe; a few people commit accounting fraud, and the ensuing uproar forces companies and banks to ramp up the size of their compliance departments by tens of thousands in the aggregate. He tells us that one of the reasons that the US has such a high surplus in the services trade is that Americans have a low propensity to travel abroad.

One more thing on the UK: I really enjoyed Power to Compete , a book made up of the dialogue between two Japanese thinkers. Thanks to Noah for making the recommendation. There is no attitude I find more refreshing. How are we going to do science fiction without an industrial base? Yes, I think so. Are we sure that the developed world is not undergoing its own premature deindustrialization? For starters: energy too cheap to meter; colonies on Mars and beyond; re-forestization of our deserts; nanotechnology that lets us print basic materials; medical devices and pharmaceuticals that prevent, treat, or cure most ailments; a deeper understanding of materials; and so many other things.

To make these all happen, we need to have the development of a lot more tools and machinery. The question then was whether the Americans or the Russians would take over the solar system. Why have we not made it a priority to look for extraterrestrial life that might exist on our planetary doorstep, within our very own solar system? Cars are becoming self-driving, and they may even fly soon; the private space efforts look very cool indeed; Boom might be bringing back supersonic jets. The US should emulate a different country. I think of Germany as the country that has done the best job of nurturing its communities of engineering practice. For decades, or maybe centuries, Germany has engaged in industrial deepening.

I was there earlier this year to study its excellence in industry. Today, German companies remain leaders in many segments of industrial technologies. Germany and the rest of Europe seem to have missed the bus to the digital age. Germany and the US have different strengths. The former is good at industry, the latter is good at information technology. But I find it odd that each is poor at what the other is good at. Both the US and Germany have experienced disappointing growth over the last few decades; I can identify incriminating data points for each country. It seems like people have mostly given up on the idea of generating wealth by doing new things.

As that share falls, I wonder how that affects the mindset of legislators, who anticipate diminishing responsibility for allocating funds. In absolute terms, the budget they control is still enormous. But I suspect that it takes away the initiative of US politicians: they can simply let the government go on autopilot, since their predecessors have already committed most available funds. If legislators no longer have room to identify new initiatives for spending, what is there to do except find new things to ban, and then argue with the other side?

The US and Germany are innovative in different ways, and they each have big flaws. I hope they fix these flaws. I believe that we can have a country in which wealth is primarily created by new economic activity, instead of by inheritance; which builds new housing stock, instead of permitting current residents to veto construction; which has a government willing to think hard about new projects that it should initiate, instead of letting the budget run on autopilot.

Development is the only hard truth or, the social consequences of economic growth. Acceptance of low economic growth is the hidden premise in most commentary that I read. I consider it to be the deepest bias in American and European intellectual society today: it pervades nearly every piece of discourse, from blog posts and bestselling books to movies and pop songs. And I find no theme more radical and refreshing than generalized frustration that economic growth is way too low.

That expectation increases risk appetites for both companies and individuals: people have seen their lives getting better in a hundred different ways in the last four decades, and they can be optimistic that more things will improve. All of this is on top of the fact that higher growth improves our capabilities to deal with various problems. I think that these principles are clear to companies in Silicon Valley, where executives make decisions based on their expected position in six months rather than their current position.

I suspect that a history of growth also has positive effects on government policies.

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