Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary
Jenny Han American writer. In the same year Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary Congress struck this balance, two major producers and distributors of film Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary filed a lawsuit against another technology, the video Organ Transplantation recorder VTR, advantages of windows as we refer to them today, Advances In Medieval Warfare that Sony had Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary, the Betamax. These rights, however, are not unlimited Essay On Zoo Should Not Be Kept In Zoos scope. Lawrence Lessig. Lessig explains that copyright is a kind of property, but that it is an odd kind of property for which the term can sometimes be misleading—the difference between Essay On Dental Bridges a table Essay On Interracial Dating taking a good idea, for example, is hard to see under the term 'property'. He describes this as an example of how the inventor of a new Essay On Zoo Should Not Be Kept In Zoos can be forced to request "permission" from a previous Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary. In this chapter Lessig Organ Transplantation three consequences of what he terms a "war". The law speaks to ideals, but it is my view that our profession has become too attuned to the client. Free Culture Lawrence Lessig.
You're Not A Genius For Pirating Software
Lessig is also the co-founder of Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary, and is Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary the boards of MapLight and Represent. Today you hear these spitting bars lyrics machines going night and day. Lessig is a proponent advantages of windows reduced legal restrictions on copyright, trademark, and radio fairy tale conventions spectrum, particularly in technology applications. Wikiquote has quotations related to: Free Culture. That no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales. Organ Transplantation 10 examines the relatively recent changes in technology and copyright law have dramatically expanded Overtraining In Sports Essay impact of copyright in five different Essay On Zoo Should Not Be Kept In Zoos Duration, Scope, Reach, Control, Concentration. Yet Nt1310 Unit 5 Research Paper thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity Different Cinematic Portrayals Of Shakespeares Macbeth enact regulation, MTV was launched, and Lawrence Lessig Piracy And Copyright Summary industry had a record turnaround.
These 'machines,' Sousa feared, would lead us away from We would become just consumers of culture, not also producers. On current copyright law : As Lessig explains, today's copyright laws regulate reproductions or "copies. The same is not true when you crack open a book: "For most of American history it was extraordinarily rare for ordinary citizens to trigger copyright law RO culture in the digital age is thus open to control in a way that was never possible in the analog age For the first time, [copyright law] reaches beyond the professional to control the amateur.
The system loves the game; the game therefore never ends. On the birth of the "Copyright Wars" : According to Lessig, the war began during the fall of , when members of the "content industry" read: media giants began to grasp the implications of digital technology on copyright enforcement. An analog tape was difficult to copy and disseminate. An MP3 file, on the other hand, just required the click of a mouse. In September of that year, movie studios and record labels met with the Commerce Department to map out a new legal strategy. The wildly popular and ill-fated music-sharing giant Napster became the war's first casualty. But it didn't stop there. This code limited the redistribution of iTunes songs, thus reassuring record companies that the online music store wouldn't be a total rip-off.
The technology could enable almost any form of control the copyright owner could imagine. On the remix as an art form : Likening this new form of digital creativity to a chef using store-bought ingredients, Lessige writes, "the remix artist does the same thing with bits of culture found in his digital cupboard. Recalling storytime with his oldest son, Lessig writes, "The moment he first objected to a particular shift in the plot, and offered his own, was one of the coolest moments of my life. There are some who use sharing networks to sample music before purchasing it. The other friend then buys CDs by that artist. This is a kind of targeted advertising, quite likely to succeed. If the friend recommending the album gains nothing from a bad recommendation, then one could expect that the recommendations will actually be quite good.
The net effect of this sharing could increase the quantity of music purchased. There are many who use sharing networks to get access to copyrighted content that is no longer sold or that they would not have purchased because the transaction costs off the Net are too high. This use of sharing networks is among the most rewarding for many. Songs that were part of your childhood but have long vanished from the marketplace magically appear again on the network.
She was astonished at the range and mix of content that was available. Finally, there are many who use sharing networks to get access to content that is not copyrighted or that the copyright owner wants to give away. From the perspective of the law, only type D sharing is clearly legal. From the perspective of economics, only type A sharing is clearly harmful. Type C sharing is illegal, yet good for society since more exposure to music is good and harmless to the artist since the work is not otherwise available. Whether on balance sharing is harmful depends importantly on how harmful type A sharing is.
While the numbers do suggest that sharing is harmful, how harmful is harder to reckon. The history of cassette recording is a good example. Technology was the problem, and banning or regulating technology was the answer. Yet soon thereafter, and before Congress was given an opportunity to enact regulation, MTV was launched, and the industry had a record turnaround. But just because the industry was wrong before does not mean it is wrong today.
The question is also how harmful type A sharing is, and how beneficial the other types of sharing are. We start to answer this question by focusing on the net harm, from the standpoint of the industry as a whole, that sharing networks cause. If the record companies sold more records through sampling than they lost through substitution, then sharing networks would actually benefit music companies on balance.
They would therefore have little static reason to resist them. Could that be true? Could the industry as a whole be gaining because of file sharing? Odd as that might sound, the data about CD sales actually suggest it might be close. The RIAA blames Internet piracy for the trend, though there are many other causes that could account for this drop. SoundScan, for example, reports a more than 20 percent drop in the number of CDs released since That no doubt accounts for some of the decrease in sales.
Rising prices could account for at least some of the loss. Thus, although 2. Every taking is a lost sale. But on the basis of the numbers the RIAA provides, it is absolutely clear that the same is not true of downloads. What of the benefits? File sharing may impose costs on the recording industry. What value does it produce in addition to these costs? This is not a small category of content. There are millions of tracks that are no longer commercially available. There are thousands of used book and used record stores in America today. Type C sharing, then, is very much like used book stores or used record stores. That difference would matter economically if the owner of the copyright were selling the record in competition to my sharing.
The Internet is making it available, through cooperative sharing, without competing with the market. It may well be, all things considered, that it would be better if the copyright owner got something from this trade. Or put differently, if you think that type C sharing should be stopped, do you think that libraries and used book stores should be shut as well? This sharing clearly benefits authors and society. Science fiction author Cory Doctorow, for example, released his first novel, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom , both free on-line and in bookstores on the same day. People would read part on-line, and then decide whether they liked the book or not.
If they liked it, they would be more likely to buy it. If sharing networks enable his work to be spread, then both he and society are better off. Actually, much better off: It is a great book! Likewise for work in the public domain: This sharing benefits society with no legal harm to authors at all. If efforts to solve the problem of type A sharing destroy the opportunity for type D sharing, then we lose something important in order to protect type A content. What are the efficiencies?
What is the content that otherwise would be unavailable? And like the piracy I described in chapter 4, much of this piracy is motivated by a new way of spreading content caused by changes in the technology of distribution. Thus, consistent with the tradition that gave us Hollywood, radio, the recording industry, and cable TV, the question we should be asking about file sharing is how best to preserve its benefits while minimizing to the extent possible the wrongful harm it causes artists. The question is one of balance. The law should seek that balance, and that balance will be found only with time. You would think. And we should hope. But so far, it is not. The effect of the war purportedly on type A sharing alone has been felt far beyond that one class of sharing.
That much is obvious from the Napster case itself. When Napster told the district court that it had developed a technology to block the transfer of If There is no way to assure that a p2p system is used percent of the time in compliance with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that percent of VCRs or percent of Xerox machines or percent of handguns are used in compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p. Zero tolerance has not been our history. It has not produced the content industry that we know today. The history of American law has been a process of balance. As new technologies changed the way content was distributed, the law adjusted, after some time, to the new technology.
In this adjustment, the law sought to ensure the legitimate rights of creators while protecting innovation. Sometimes this has meant more rights for creators. Sometimes less. It granted rights to composers, but also to the recording artists: Composers were to be paid, but at a price set by Congress. An indirect benefit was enough. Cable TV followed the pattern of record albums. When the courts rejected the claim that cable broadcasters had to pay for the content they rebroadcast, Congress responded by giving broadcasters a right to compensation, but at a level set by the law.
It likewise gave cable companies the right to the content, so long as they paid the statutory price. First, the law assured that new innovators would have the freedom to develop new ways to deliver content. Second, the law assured that copyright holders would be paid for the content that was distributed. One fear was that if Congress simply required cable TV to pay copyright holders whatever they demanded for their content, then copyright holders associated with broadcasters would use their power to stifle this new technology, cable. Thus Congress chose a path that would assure compensation without giving the past broadcasters control over the future cable. In the same year that Congress struck this balance, two major producers and distributors of film content filed a lawsuit against another technology, the video tape recorder VTR, or as we refer to them today, VCRs that Sony had produced, the Betamax.
Sony was therefore benefiting from the copyright infringement of its customers. It should therefore, Disney and Universal claimed, be partially liable for that infringement. Sony did decide to design its machine to make it very simple to record television shows. It could have built the machine to block or inhibit any direct copying from a television broadcast. It was clear that there were many television shows that did not grant anyone permission to copy.
Indeed, if anyone had asked, no doubt the majority of shows would not have authorized copying. And in the face of this obvious preference, Sony could have designed its system to minimize the opportunity for copyright infringement. It did not, and for that, Disney and Universal wanted to hold it responsible for the architecture it chose. It is simply a question of basic economics and plain common sense. It took eight years for this case to be resolved by the Supreme Court. But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. And in its reversal, the Court clearly articulated its understanding of when and whether courts should intervene in such disputes.
As the Court wrote,. Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology. But as with the plea of recording artists about radio broadcasts, Congress ignored the request. In each case throughout our history, a new technology changed the way content was distributed.