How Did Georges Clemenceau Impact France

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How Did Georges Clemenceau Impact France

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The Allied armies under Foch's command ultimately held the advance of the German forces. I was in close touch with him in He is a better man now than he was then, for his fiery enthusiasm has been tempered by adversity. The Rhine was for him a river of life and death. At the sixth session of the Supreme War Council on 1 June Foch complained that the BEF was still shrinking in size and infuriated Lloyd George by implying that the British government was withholding manpower.

The British were disappointed that Foch operated through his own staff rather than through the Permanent Military Representatives at Versailles , and on 11 July British ministers resolved to remind Foch that he was an Allied, and not a French, C-in-C. On 6 August , Foch was made a Marshal of France. After the war, he claimed to have defeated Germany by smoking his pipe. Before the armistice and after the Armistice of Villa Giusti , Foch controlled all the operations against Germany including a planned invasion from Italy into Bavaria.

However, he refused to accede to the German negotiators' immediate request to declare a ceasefire or truce so that there would be no more useless waste of lives among the common soldiers. By not declaring a truce even between the signing of the documents for the Armistice at a. He received many honours and decorations from Allied governments. In the euphoria of victory Foch was regularly compared to Napoleon and Julius Caesar. However, historians took a less favourable view of Foch's talents as commander, particularly as the idea took root that his military doctrines had set the stage for the futile and costly offensives of in which French armies suffered devastating losses.

Supporters and critics continue to debate Foch's strategy and instincts as a commander, as well as his exact contributions to the Marne "miracle": Foch's counter-attacks at the Marne generally failed, but his sector resisted determined German attacks while holding the pivot on which the neighbouring French and British forces depended in rolling back the German line. After the reading of the preamble of the November armistice , Foch left the carriage , in a move that was perceived as humiliating by the defeated Germans. In , after the defeat of France by Germany early in World War II , when France signed an armistice with Germany , Adolf Hitler , in a calculated gesture of disdain to the French delegates, left the carriage, as Foch had done in Foch's pre-war contributions as a military theorist and lecturer have also been recognised, and he has been credited as "the most original and subtle mind in the French Army " of the early 20th century.

In January , at the Paris Peace Conference Foch presented a memorandum to the Allied plenipotentiaries in which he stated:. Henceforward the Rhine ought to be the Western military frontier of the German countries. Henceforward Germany ought to be deprived of all entrance and assembling ground, that is, of all territorial sovereignty on the left bank of the river, that is, of all facilities for invading quickly, as in , Belgium , Luxembourg , for reaching the coast of the North Sea and threatening the United Kingdom, for outflanking the natural defences of France, the Rhine, Meuse , conquering the Northern Provinces and entering the Parisian area.

In a subsequent memorandum, Foch argued that the Allies should take full advantage of their victory by permanently weakening German power in order to prevent her from threatening France again:. What the people of Germany fear the most is a renewal of hostilities since, this time, Germany would be the field of battle and the scene of the consequent devastation.

This makes it impossible for the yet unstable German Government to reject any demand on our part if it is clearly formulated. The Entente , in its present favourable military situation, can obtain acceptance of any peace conditions it may put forward provided that they are presented without much delay. All it has to do is to decide what they shall be. However, the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and the American President Woodrow Wilson objected to the detachment of the Rhineland from Germany so that the balance of power would not be too much in favor of France, but agreed to Allied military occupation for fifteen years, which Foch thought insufficient to protect France. Foch considered the Treaty of Versailles to be "a capitulation, a treason " because he believed that only permanent occupation of the Rhineland would grant France sufficient security against a revival of German aggression.

It is an armistice for 20 years". Foch was made a British Field Marshal in , [43] and, for his advice during the Polish—Soviet War of , as well as his pressure on Germany during the Greater Poland Uprising , he was awarded the title of Marshal of Poland in On 1 November Foch was in Kansas City, Missouri , to take part in the groundbreaking ceremony for the Liberty Memorial that was being constructed there. Pershing of the United States. Foch made a mile circuit through the U. During the tour, he received numerous honorary degrees from American Universities. Foch died on 20 March He was buried in Les Invalides , next to Napoleon and other famous French soldiers and officers. In his remains were translated to a monumental tomb sculpted by Paul Landowski , with inspiration form the 15th-century Tomb of Philippe Pot , [45] at the center of the Dome Church's northeastern chapel Chapelle Saint-Ambroise.

This statue was the one item left undisturbed by the Germans following their defeat of France in June Following the signing of France's surrender on 21 June, the Germans ravaged the area surrounding the railway car in which both the and surrenders had taken place. The statue was left standing, to view nothing but a wasteland. The Armistice site was restored by German prisoner-of-war labour following the Second World War, with its memorials and monuments either restored or reassembled.

A heavy cruiser and an aircraft carrier were named in his honor. An early district of Gdynia , Poland was also named "Foch" after the Marshal but was renamed by the communist government after the Second World War. Nevertheless, one of the major avenues of the town of Bydgoszcz , located then in the Polish corridor , holds Foch's name as sign of gratitude for his campaigning for an independent Poland. Avenue Foch , a street in Paris, was named after him.

This is where French garrison soldiers were housed while Berlin was divided. Fochville in South Africa was also named in his honour. A statue of Foch stands near Victoria railway station in London. He is the only Frenchman ever to be made an honorary field-marshal by the British. General Debeney spoke at the statue's unveiling in , praising Foch's operational concepts of In the Belgian city of Leuven , one of the central squares was named after him after the First World War, but it was renamed in By special vote of the board of directors of the Knights of Columbus , he became the one millionth knight of that order.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about the French military commander. For other uses, see Foch disambiguation. French general and military theorist. General Foch c. Retrieved 13 April Indiana UP. ISBN Cambridge UP. Liddell Hart 31 May Foch — The Man of Orleans. Read Books Limited. Foch: Sa vie. Sa doctrine. La foi en la victoire in French. OUP Oxford. In Chisholm, Hugh ed. The Reader's Companion to Military History. Houghton Mifflin. See: Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary. The London Gazette. British Library Serials. That is to say, by not getting excited, by reducing everything to simple terms, by avoiding useless emotions, and keeping all my strength for the job.

Simonds, History of the World War , Vol. EyeWitness to History. Archived from the original on 26 November Retrieved 26 November New York : Random House. The London Gazette Supplement. Creaphis editions. Retrieved 27 July Retrieved 22 May Foch, Ferdinand. A Dictionary of Contemporary World History 3rd ed. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 9 October The Billings Weekly Gazette. Billings, Montana. Les Principes de la guerre. Translated by T Bentley Mott Heinemann ed. London: William Heinemann. OCLC Retrieved 15 October Paris: Soteca, DiDomenico, Joseph J.

Marshall Foch online Greenhalgh, Elizabeth. Foch in Command. Victory Through Coalition. Douglas Haig and the First World War. By November , the dominance of Wilsonian and Bolshevik thinking on an end to imperial aggrandisement had even resulted in an Anglo-French declaration that self-determination should be applied to the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire. The world of autumn was one which felt very unsafe, particularly in ideological respects, for the colonial empires, both victorious and defeated. Revolutionary upheaval had become the norm across Germany , Russia and Austria-Hungary by the end of In this bloody world of revolution and counter-revolution the European dynastic empires did not survive: Kaiser Wilhelm abdicated on 9 November , Charles I, Emperor of Austria went into exile on 12 November and Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia , forced out in , was executed a year later.

From this perspective, the First World War had unleashed a wave of decolonisation within Europe. As Joshua Sanborn has illustrated, the upheavals involved in mobilising the imperial state and its disparate peoples to fight the First World War proved far too great a challenge. Much more worryingly, it unleashed an ethno-political dynamic, often brutally violent in nature, which tore at the already tenuous unity of the empire. It was here that local officials, nationalist politicians, warlords and "White" opponents stepped into the power vacuum provided by the collapse of the state to forge new local and regional regimes.

By the close of the civil war in the Bolsheviks had succeeded in quelling the vast majority of these challengers. Finland, the Baltic states and Poland had, however, broken free of Moscow; for these new nations the First World War and its aftermath represented a clear decolonising moment. For the peoples of Ukraine , the Caucasus and central Asia the reverse was true. Although having briefly tasted freedom from Russian control, by the early s the Bolsheviks had succeeded in re-colonising these borderland areas, the only difference being that imperial authority was now replaced by the centralised control of the party machine.

The concept of re-colonisation was also evident in the manner in which the German Empire viewed aspects of its war on the Eastern Front. For expansionist-minded sections of the German military, as well as right-wing radicals and state bureaucrats, this new colonial space offered a chance to build a buffer zone against future Russian aggression. Eastern Europe, in particular the unrealised opportunities provided by Ukraine to sustain the German war effort through its grain supplies, offered a chance to turn the tide of the conflict through imperial expansion. German defeat on the Western Front ensured that such dreams of a continental empire, with all its ethnic complexities, were destroyed by the end of These would emerge, reinvigorated and based around a destructive ethno-political ideology, as central to the Nazi "imperial" project of the s and s.

The idea of the First World War as a decolonising moment influenced the victorious colonial powers as well. For much of the interwar period, the spectre of imperial collapse, not least that instigated by the Bolshevik Revolution, would haunt colonial administrators in London, Paris and peripheral territories, as well as inspire many anti-colonial nationalists. Kanya-Forstner has suggested, the First World War had little import as a decolonising moment for Britain and France, although it did suggest the inherent vulnerabilities of their imperial systems.

This is the supposition this article will tackle: to what extent were the British and French colonial regimes teetering on the brink of their demise in the wake of the First World War? In order to grasp the shifts in the nature of colonial rule in the wake of the Great War, it is first necessary to consider how the colonial empires mobilised and adapted to fight the conflict. For France and Britain their colonial territories were a vast reservoir of vital raw materials which could fuel their industrial war efforts. More importantly, their empires provided manpower on such a scale as to offset their quantitative disadvantages on European battlefields.

During the Entente deployed over , soldiers from its colonies in Europe. France, in particular, was heavily reliant on the men it enlisted from its African possessions which contributed , Algerians, , West Africans, 60, Tunisians, 37, Moroccans and 34, Madagascans to the defence of the metropole. Adolphe Messimy had argued for an Algerian army of , men and Colonel Charles Mangin advocated for an even larger force noire with which to repel European opponents. These schemes met with little success prior to The appalling losses endured by the French Army on the Western Front meant that colonial manpower would increasingly take on a greater share of the fighting.

By the time Georges Clemenceau had become premier in November , French Africa had provided an additional , troops. Recruiting in the colonial empire relied both on volunteers and conscription, with the balance shifting increasingly towards the latter as the war dragged on and tales of the horrors of the front line were disseminated by returning injured veterans. On reaching villages, recruiters in West Africa increasingly found that young men suitable for military service had fled into the bush or were malingering with self-inflicted wounds.

However, uprisings in Western Volta in and Dahomey in were only partly attributable to the demand for wartime military manpower. Bringing the mobilisation methods of " total war " to the periphery of empire was often the final step that exacerbated longer-term problems of limited local legitimacy facing colonial administrations. British imperial recruiters experienced many of the same obstacles when trying to extract manpower from colonies in Africa and South Asia. Indeed, colonial recruiting mechanisms themselves were often far from perfect, heightening the difficulties faced when trying to get recalcitrant colonial subjects to sign up for military service often far from home and in defence of a remote imperial regime.

In November , a colonel carrying out a recruiting tour of local villages near Amritsar in northern India found himself to be one of forty-two competing regimental recruiting parties in the neighbourhood. Despite such obstacles Britain was able to raise a considerable imperial army during the course of the First World War. In particular, India proved a fertile recruiting ground, providing nearly 1. British West African colonies raised 57, carriers, East Africa and Nyasaland provided , each and Uganda 19, The East African campaign was fought on the backs of African labour.

It was not only colonial soldiers who contributed to the French and British imperial war efforts. As important were the large numbers of civilian labourers recruited to work in French factories, maintain the lines of communication and run the array of support services that modern armies required to wage a " total war " on the Western Front. Nearly 50, Indochinese workers served alongside 35, Moroccans, 18, Tunisians and 76, Algerians. Britain deployed , labourers from the colonial world to Europe, including over 31, black South Africans and 92, Chinese workers.

This was a process highly disruptive to colonial economies, particularly those based on manpower-intensive agrarian production. The mobilisation of the British and French colonial empires during the First World War offers striking contrasts in attitudes to the use of colonial soldiers which would greatly shape post-war political agitation in colonial territories. In the British case voluntarism remained the guiding principle. In India and Africa, by the later stages of the war, the nature of this voluntarism was open to question.

Inducements from recruiting parties, pressure on local community elders and what amounted to press gangs all became common. In contrast, French recruitment made use of conscription, fundamentally altering the relationship between the imperial combatant and colonial state; this opened up a dangerous route to claims of citizenship derived from collective blood sacrifice in defence of the metropole.

The different uses to which these colonial armies were put is also striking. In the French case, West and North African troops were primarily recruited to defend France from German aggression, a task which required their deployment on European battlefields. For Britain, non-white colonial troops, with the exception of the Indian Corps on the Western Front in , were used for combat outside Europe, primarily in the Middle East and Africa. In a very basic sense, by November Britain possessed a clear strategic advantage in the Middle East. Indian Army formations occupied much of the territory from Egypt to Mesopotamia. On the other hand, French ambitions, as evinced by the colonialist lobby and selected ministers rather than the government, to rule over a Greater Syrian colony were in many respects a fantasy that ignored very basic realities on the ground.

Despite the wartime division of the Middle East between the two powers in the Sykes-Picot agreement of February , it was not until September that France was able to begin its expansion into Syria. For France, the ability to continue to mobilise colonial subject populations was a key requirement of any post-war peace settlement. The war persuaded Clemenceau that the empire could provide a viable substitute for French manpower which was in increasingly short supply given the losses of the conflict and a declining birth rate. Colonel Edward M. Nonetheless, Simon stuck to the demand and acquired British and American acceptance over the course of the winter of In the wake of the First World War the pressing question for Britain and France was less one of future mobilisations and more of how to demobilise their vast imperial armies.

Returning soldiers proved not just a logistical nightmare, particularly given the post-war shortage of merchant shipping, but were also a potential source of domestic unrest. Many of the veterans returning to the French colony of Guinea resented the local chiefs who had helped force them into military service and, during , were at the forefront of industrial disputes, assaulting chiefs and settler plantation managers, symbols of the unequal colonial system of economic and political rule. In the case of Jamaica, returning soldiers from the British West Indies Regiment were frequently disappointed by the lack of job opportunities within the restrictive plantation economy.

In Senegal, the problems facing returning soldiers were not just economic. The colony was in crisis due to outbreaks of bubonic plague in most major urban centres during which killed at least in Dakar and over in Rufisque. Attempts by the colonial authorities to contain the problem were sluggish. Urban clearance and the isolation of infected individuals in quarantine hostels caused widespread local anger. In rural areas, vaccination schemes and the disposal of the dead ignored local customs, traditional medicine, religious practices and funeral rites.

The colonial state appeared to be destroying indigenous society while at the same time professing to save it. For many colonial soldiers, however, demobilisation could not come fast enough. Large numbers of troops from both the British and French Empires were retained after the end of hostilities to serve in occupation roles. It was, above all, a pragmatic solution to the pressing needs of wartime states which were adapting to the necessities of the post-war peace. It allowed the French and British Armies to demobilise their metropolitan soldiers first, assuaging demands at home and from the men themselves, while colonial troops were used as substitutes until the peace settlements were clarified.

Wartime colonial mobilisation and the service of large numbers of colonial soldiers and labourers in Europe or in defence and expansion of empire impressed upon London and Paris the need for colonial reform. In some respects, this was portrayed as a reward for the wartime service of these colonial peoples, demonstrating that imperial rule was a reciprocal and benevolent practice. More pertinently, it was a way to assuage the demands of politically awakened veterans who would now claim greater rights and freedoms. From early in the war, for example, the Indian government worried about potential political upheaval from any number of anti-colonial opponents, whether armed Sikh militants, Bengali terrorists, or, following the Ottoman entry into the war, an increasingly active pan-Islamic movement.

The viceroy, Frederic Chelmsford, Lord Chelmsford , was eager to pre-empt any potential challenges to the Raj and to respond to calls to reward Indian military service for the King-Emperor. In August the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were announced, promising the gradual development of self-governing institutions and the progressive realisation of responsible government with the proviso that India remained an integral part of the empire. These reforms although rejected by the Indian National Congress, the principal nationalist organisation, which considered the measures to be too little, too slowly delivered nonetheless set the pattern for British attempts at containing political opposition throughout the interwar years.

In the French Empire similar promises of reform were made to colonial populations as a reward for their wartime service. In his supporters were swept to victory in local and mayoral elections in the four communes, marginalising the settler interests that had previously dominated. French imperial rule seemed, on the face of it, to be subject to moderating forces and to be responding to the wartime sacrifices of its colonial subjects. The reality was somewhat different. Compared to the steps being taken in India, which tied the nationalist movement into a constitutional settlement rather than radical activism, the French reforms in West and North Africa made little difference to the nature of colonial rule and the daily experience of racial subjugation. Twenty chiefs chosen by the governor-general were inserted to represent people from outside the four communes, men who could be relied upon to support the administration against the demands of the elected members.

Elsewhere in French West Africa urban centres given the status of communes-mixtes where city councils were elected on limited franchises found that these bodies were merely advisory to their French mayors. Despite the wartime promises of French citizenship by there were only 2, African "citizens" outside the four communes. The mass of the population remained subjects, governed by summary administrative justice and collective fines and were often employed as forced labour.

The same story of restricted rights and limited reforms was evident in North Africa. Muslim voters in Algeria formed a separate electoral college and could only vote for their representatives. The settler community retained its political dominance despite its numerical inferiority. The fundamental iniquity of colonial rule remained: Muslim Algerians were still denied any representation in Paris.

Again, the opportunities for gaining French citizenship appeared to be illusory as access to such status was conditional on Algerians revoking their Muslim identity. This served to deter all but 1, Algerians from seeking to become citizens between and The comparison of French West and North Africa with British India implied above is somewhat unfair, suggesting that the best traditions of the British Empire as a liberal reforming force were applied universally after the First World War. Such reforms were not applied more widely across the British Empire, with territories in Africa run with as little regard for the local population as those of the French. Colonial reform was thus a chimerical notion for many subjects of the British and French Empires.

Reform of the colonial system after the Great War was not solely a product of the "benevolence" of imperial rulers. It was, in some respects, forced upon Britain and France by the shifting nature of international relations, most notably the rise of Wilsonian ideals of internationalism embodied most prominently in the League of Nations. One of the key areas of the peace settlements that pertained to the colonial world was the question of how to deal with the former German and Ottoman imperial territories. Wilson led the charge for a peace that was without annexations and which would see colonial claims dealt with in a transparent manner. This was a direct challenge to the great power division of the colonial world that had dominated for much of the nineteenth century.

Britain and France were equally clear that the newly occupied colonies would not be returned to their defeated former colonial masters. In presentations at the peace conference both argued that the insertion of some form of international regime as a colonial steward would be certain to fail. Three types of mandate were proposed based upon the supposed stage of development of the subject population. These mandates included the former German colonies of Togoland and Cameroon, both of which were partitioned between Britain and France; Rwanda and Burundi passed to Belgian control and the rest of German East Africa went to Britain as Tanganyika.

The final category of "C" mandates was reserved for remote territories about which the European colonial powers cared little, but which were of interest to Japan and the British Dominions, states beginning to forge their own, smaller imperial realms to ensure their regional dominance. The "C" mandates had a particularly ambiguous status and were perceived as being a long way from ever achieving self-government.

Mandatory powers were allowed to administer them effectively as integral parts of their territory, a position which the South African representative at Versailles, Jan Smuts , declared as amounting to "annexation in all but name. The establishment of the mandate system as a functioning element within the colonial division of the world, the enshrining of the principle of trusteeship in the League of Nations charter, and the role of the PMC as a check on the actions of the mandatory powers appeared to indicate a clear shift in international relations.

Supporters of the League saw the mandates as a progression from discredited 19 th century forms of imperial rule, benevolent in intent and, crucially, intended to be of limited duration. Yet as Susan Pedersen has argued, it is very difficult to generalise about the administration of the mandates, as there was a great deal of variation in the manner in which individual territories, even those supposedly of the same category, were administered.

For example, in Tanganyika and Transjordan Britain introduced land reforms but Australia devoted few resources to New Guinea because it saw the territory merely as a buffer state. In South-West Africa, the South African government simply shipped in white settlers and accelerated the process of dispossessing the indigenous population of its land.

It was also evident that the principle of trusteeship as envisaged by the League was not necessarily the reality on the ground. Yet such moderation was not applied universally, with Britain and France both resorting to repressive colonial policing methods to ensure internal security within their Middle Eastern mandates. Revolt in Syria in , which began among the Druze population and soon spread across much of the country, was only contained by the use of the Levant Army and irregular forces.

Notoriously the bombardment of Damascus in October resulted in over 1, residents being killed. Nevertheless, the mandatory system did impose a new framework for the international oversight of the actions of the colonial powers. However, its oversight was not meaningless. Although all but one of the members of the PMC were Europeans and four were drawn from the mandatory powers themselves, they turned out to be much more critical and less tractable than expected, in particular the British appointee, Sir Frederick Lugard , former governor-general of Nigeria, and the Spanish and Belgian representatives.

Most importantly, the PMC acted as a forum for petitioners from within the mandates to raise problems with the activities of the mandatory powers. This was an opportunity that nationalist activists chose to exploit and which caused such concern for the colonial powers that they persuaded the Council in to curtail the rights of petitioners.

For all its deficiencies, the PMC and mandatory system should, as Pedersen suggests, be seen as a discursive arena rather than an engine for socio-economic development or progress for supposedly backwards peoples towards self-government. It provided an opportunity for nationalists in Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific to appeal to international opinion and to publicise their critiques of the mandatory powers. Colonial rule for much of the interwar period was now scrutinised through a new lens with the emergence of a mechanism capable of highlighting its failings and misdemeanours on the global stage.

The internationalist rhetoric that originated with Wilson had thus given birth to what some contemporaries saw as a new colonial era, at least at an ideological level, even if the realities of colonial rule remained hierarchical and oppressive for the subject populations concerned. This was achieved by drastically scaling back the Turkish military, requiring Turkish recognition of minority rights and internationalizing the Straits. Britain was given the mandates of Palestine and Mesopotamia, with Transjordan as an off-shoot of the former. France was awarded the mandates of Lebanon and Syria. The mandate system was here being used to simply validate the realities of European colonial power within the Middle East.

The treaty was, therefore, a codification of the often fraught discussions between Britain and France during Wartime promises made by Britain to the Arabs in were ignored because they were no longer compatible with the settlement London and Paris wished to impose. These conflicting obligations were overridden by the outcome of the war in the Middle East which left British forces in occupation of vast swathes of the former Ottoman Empire. The Arab regime of Faysal established in Damascus after the war only survived with the protection and financial support of Britain. Despite the loss of Syria, Faysal and his supporters were not written out of Middle Eastern politics.

In August he was crowned king of Iraq, part of a British attempt to impose order on its new mandate and legitimise its role of guiding the territory towards self-government. Old diplomacy had seemingly triumphed over the ideas of Wilsonian internationalism and the war had served only to entrench the colonial system of rule across much of the extra-European world. Such an interpretation does not hold true when considering the attempt to impose a peace settlement on Turkey, where imperialist ambitions were thwarted in their attempt to partition Anatolia. Kemal was a strong advocate of Turkish independence and gathered a group of like-minded nationalists who became the rallying point for those opposed to the ineffectual government in Constantinople and the Greek occupation of Smyrna and its hinterland.

Turkish nationalists formulated a set of demands the National Covenant which abandoned Ottoman imperial and pan-Turkish designs and concentrated instead on the limited and realistic goal of securing a sovereign and independent state based on areas with a Muslim majority. Kemal envisaged a future state that would be secured around the Anatolian heartlands, retained Smyrna and Constantinople and had a European frontier in Thrace. British attempts to use Greece as a proxy for its imperial ambitions in Turkey, in part driven by the philhellenism of Lloyd George, proved an abysmal disaster. By late summer Greek forces had been defeated and then expelled from their enclave around Smyrna in an orgy of inter-communal violence.

In the ensuing Chanak crisis in September Britain was left to face Turkish military aggression alone as France had secured a deal with Kemal in order to safeguard its position in Syria. By the end of , Kemal had achieved everything he set out to do, crucially securing the Turkish state from external aggressors. Lausanne demonstrates the somewhat confused legacy of the First World War for the colonial powers.

It left Britain and France still in possession of vast swathes of the Middle East and recognised their imperial conquests but, at the same time, demonstrated that new, ethnically-defined nationalist forces were at play and were perfectly capable of re-negotiating the terms of colonial settlements through force and diplomacy.

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